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Abstract
Are emerging economies implementing inflation targeting (IT) with a perfectly flexible
exchange-rate arrangement, as developed economies do, or have these countries developed
their own IT framework? This paper offers a new method for assessing exchange-rate
policies that combines the use of “indicator countries”, providing an empirical definition
of exchange-rate flexibility or rigidity, and clustering through Gaussian mixture estimates
in order to identify countries’ de facto regimes. By applying this method to 19 inflation-
targeting emerging economies, I find that the probability of those countries having a
perfectly flexible arrangement as developed economies do is 52%, while the probability
of having a managed float system, obtained through foreign exchange market interven-
tion, is 28%, and that of having a rigid exchange-rate system (similar to those of pegged
currencies) is 20%. The results also provide evidence of two different monetary regimes
under inflation targeting: flexible IT when the monetary authorities handle only one tool,
the interest rate, prevailing in ten economies, and hybrid IT when the monetary authori-
ties add foreign exchange interventions to their toolbox, prevailing in the remaining nine
economies.
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1 Introduction
Exchange-rate volatility has long been described as the Achilles’ heel of inflation-targeting
(IT) regimes in emerging economies. Owing to the particularities of emerging economies and
the fact that IT was generally intended to go hand in hand with a freely floating exchange
rate, it was argued that IT as it is applied in developed economies would not be a panacea for
emerging economies1. However, since New Zealand first adopted IT in December 1989, this
framework has become a standard operating procedure, particularly in emerging economies.
Today, of the 29 economies that fulfil the standard criterion that defines IT, 19 are emerg-
ing economies (see Hammond 2012). Based on these findings, this paper examines whether
emerging economies implement similar IT strategies to developed economies or whether these
countries adopt particular policies, especially towards exchange-rate flexibility. Is the ex-
change rate as flexible in IT emerging economies as in IT developed economies or is it less
flexible or perhaps more controlled? Are foreign exchange market interventions more frequent
in IT emerging economies than in IT developed economies or is there little difference?
It is generally agreed that the exchange rate plays a greater role - both as a tool and as a target
- in monetary policy in emerging economies than in developed economies. This is due to the
enhanced role played by exchange-rate channels in emerging economies, which are generally
attributed to greater vulnerability to shocks, lower policy credibility and underdeveloped
domestic financial markets (see Stone et al. 2009). The prominent role played by the exchange
rate in emerging economies” monetary policy is also associated with two phenomena: the “fear
of floating” (Calvo & Reinhart 2002) and the “fear of appreciation” (Levy-Yeyati et al. 2013).
According to Cavoli2009, the first phenomenon is justified by three factors: the fear of trade
contraction due to higher exchange-rate volatility, a higher pass-through from the exchange
rate to domestic prices in emerging economies than in developed economies, and balance
sheet effects caused by currency mismatches and liability dollarisation. Levy-Yeyati et al.
(2013) attribute the second phenomenon to concerns over losing competitiveness. Aghion
et al. (2009) also demonstrate that exchange-rate volatility reduces growth in countries with
relatively less developed financial sectors.
Therefore, even if they do not set a particular exchange-rate target, the monetary authorities
in emerging economies’ are more concerned by the exchange rate than their counterparts
in developed economies. This idea has been analysed in the literature in such a way so as
to suggest that the central banks of emerging economies should give more weight to the
exchange rate in their reaction function than developed economies. Hence, on the theoretical
side, various models2 have been developed to explain in which circumstances the central banks
of emerging economies are justified in using a Taylor rule augmented by the exchange rate
1See Mishkin (2004).
2See Batini et al. 2003, Moron & Winkelried 2005, Cavoli & Rajan 2006, Yilmazkuday 2007, Cavoli
2008, Ravenna & Natalucci 2008, Roger et al. 2009, Stone et al. 2009, Bénassy-Quéré & Salins 2010 and
Pavasuthipaisit 2010
2
while, on the empirical side, a large number of papers3 have estimated such open-economy
Taylor rules.
However, those papers in which exchange-rate policy is analysed using the Taylor rule ar-
gument only are missing the smoking gun: the most prominent policy is foreign exchange
market intervention4. Surprisingly, foreign exchange market intervention under inflation tar-
geting has not received much attention in the literature5. The main two reasons behind this
are, first, macroeconomic models are not well suited to assessing the use of two instruments
by one agent (both an interest rate instrument and foreign market intervention) and, second,
the channel of foreign exchange market intervention is not yet clearly understood empirically
or theoretically. However, the need to address foreign exchange market interventions is grow-
ing, as central banking practices increasingly seem to rely on a “two targets, two instruments”
principle6.
This paper aims to fill the gap in the literature: it offers a method for assessing central
bank inflation-targeting exchange-rate policy in emerging economies through exchange market
interventions, rather than as an augmented Taylor rule. Based on the methodology developed
by Levy-Yeyati & Sturzenegger (2005) for classifying exchange-rate arrangements, the degree
of flexibility of an exchange rate is defined by the behaviour of both its nominal exchange
rate and foreign exchange market interventions. Using a Gaussian mixture model, I compute
the probability of any inflation-targeting emerging economy having a floating exchange-rate
arrangement, an intermediate system or a fixed exchange-rate system. The definition of
each regime is assessed by two pools of “indicator countries”, from which data are randomly
selected to form a control sample in a bootstrapping loop. My results strongly support the
existence of two distinct inflation-targeting regimes: a flexible inflation-targeting regime with
a flexible exchange-rate as in developed economies, and a hybrid inflation-targeting regime
under which the exchange rate is more controlled and less flexible. However, the share of
hybrid inflation-targeters is small: 10 out of 19 inflation-targeting emerging economies (ITEE)
have an exchange rate as flexible as that of inflation-targeting developed economies.
This paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents and discusses the literature on deeds ver-
sus words exchange-rate regime classification; Section 3 offers a method for assessing exchange-
rate control through foreign exchange market interventions, specifically designed to deal with
inflation-targeting emerging economies; Section 4 describes the data; and section 5 presents
3 See Corbo et al. 2001, Mohanty & Klau 2005, Edwards 2006, Aizenman et al. 2011 and Frömmel et al.
2011.
4As emphasized by Stone et al. (2009, page 25) “Foreign exchange interventions (...) is the main exchange-
rate policy implementation tool”.
5With the notable exception of Berganza & Broto (2012) and Chang (2008).
6 This was described by Ostry et al. (2012, page 13) as follows : “the central bank may opt for an
IT regime, subordinating its monetary policy to achieving the inflation objective. If, as the discussion above
suggests, emerging markets economies central banks also have available a second instrument (foreign exchange
intervention), they can also limit temporary movements of the exchange-rate without prejudicing attainment
of their primary target, the inflation rate.”
3
the results. The last section briefly concludes.
2 Deeds vs words: the need for de facto exchange-rate regimes
classification.
Which economies have a floating exchange-rate and which ones have a stickier arrangement?
This is a deceptively simple question. The basic and instinctive answer would be to look
at monetary authorities’ statements on the external value of their currencies. Until 1999,
this official information was collected by the IMF and published in its Annual Report on
Exchange-Rate Arrangements and Exchange Restriction. However, the fear of potential gaps
between officially reported exchange-rate regimes and those which actually prevailed led to
alternative de facto classifications of exchange-rate regimes being constructed in order to test
whether the announced policy reflected the actual policy in place. Even if these papers differ
in the conclusions reached at the country level, there is a clear consensus that, in practice,
many exchange-rate regimes do not function according to the de jure rules.
Evidence for this initially involved fixed exchange-rate arrangements. One of the most promi-
nent papers on the topic, Obstfeld & Rogoff (1995), argues that in the post-Bretton Wood
environment, the concept of a fixed exchange rate is a “mirage”7. The idea was then extended
to the floating arrangement when, in a nod to Obstfeld and Rogoff, Reinhart (2000) wrote
“The Mirage of Floating Exchange Rates”. Using the US dollar, the German deutschemark
and the Japanese yen as benchmarks to define flexible exchange-rate arrangements, Reinhart
reaches the following conclusions (p65): “Countries that say they allow their exchange-rate
to float mostly do not; there seems to be an epidemic case of ‘fear of floating’.”8
Many de facto classifications, relying on a wide variety of econometrical and statistical meth-
ods, have followed. Therefore, exchange-rate classification methods have almost become a
field of research in themselves, as described by Tavlas et al. (2008). The three main results
of this literature are presented below.
First of all, the de jure classification predicts those classifications built on facts very badly.
Table 1, page 5 summarises the correspondence among the official classification and three
standard de jure classifications: Ghosh et al. (2000) (denoted by GGW), Levy-Yeyati &
Sturzenegger (2005) (denoted by LYS) and Reinhart & Rogoff (2004) (denoted by RR). It
7 Obstfeld & Rogoff (1995) : “aside from some small tourism economies, oil sheikdoms and highly dependent
principalities, literally only a handful of countries in the world today have continuously maintained tightly
fixed exchange-rates against any currency for five years or more.” (p 87) Also, on the determinants of this
evolution: “There is little question that the biggest single factor has been the dramatic evolution of world
capital markets” and “shifting capital flows”. (p77)
8 She also notes that “The low variability of the nominal exchange-rate is not owing to the absence of real
or nominal shocks in these economies.” It is “the deliberate result of policy actions to stabilize the exchange-
rate.” Also “most of the episodes that come under the heading of floating exchange-rates look more like non
credible pegs”, underlining a credibility problem. Reinhart (2000, page 65)
4
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2013.74
displays the large discrepancy between the de jure regimes and any given de facto definition.
This result also stresses the need to use a de facto classification while studying, for instance,
the impact of exchange rate regimes on a macro variable like growth or the determinants of
the choice of exchange-rate regime.
GGW LYS RR
IMF de jure 0.60 0.28 0.33
Table 1: De jure and de facto correlations.
Source: Frankel & Wei (2008b)
Second, building an exchange rate classification relying only on facts is not an easy task. Only
very few classifications do not rely on any de jure component and, moreover, the various de
facto regimes barely correspond any more closely to one another than to the official regime.
Finally, the definition of an exchange rate is relative. It is almost impossible to define an
exchange-rate regime as fixed or floating by applying a threshold or ex ante criterion on
exchange-rate volatility or, indeed, on any other variable. The variables that define a policy
have to be analysed jointly and carefully. De facto regimes also rarely correspond to the ideal
view but are more likely to result from a negative inference: for example, a country does not
have a flexible arrangement because its central bank never intervenes in the foreign exchange
market, but rather because the central bank intervenes relatively less frequently than other
central banks. The approach developed by Levy-Yeyati & Sturzenegger (2005) is, in this
way, quite accurate. They propose a purely statistical classification methodology, which does
not rely on any de jure component coming from an official source or any threshold left to the
author’s discretion. Economies are only ranked or classified in relation to their characteristics.
Among the various methods developed in the literature that of LYS distinguishes itself in
that the number of currencies used to define a country’s exchange rate is flexible. In the
general case, one reference currency (the main trade and finance partner) is used, but where
there is no such immediate reference currency, or where a basket peg is known, a weighted
exchange-rate can also be used. The exchange-rate series considered are the official ones and
not those from the parallel or black markets as in Reinhart & Rogoff (2004). As long as
the classification is not used to study bilateral trade, this seems to be fair (see Shambaugh
2004). Both the exchange rate and some exchange-rate control instruments are used to define
a regime, unlike in hard peg regime studies such as Frankel et al. (2001), Bénassy-Quéré
& Coeuré (2002) and Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2006). LYS use foreign exchange reserves to
measure foreign exchange interventions, as in Edwards & Savastano (1999), Reinhart (2000)
and Edwards (2002). Their measure is a close substitute for the exchange market pressure
proposed by Girton & Roper (1977) and used by Frankel & Wei (2008a), Frankel & Xie (2009)
and Frankel & Xie (2010). The method adopted by LYS is purely statistical, as in Frankel &
5
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Wei (2008a) and Frankel & Xie (2010), and thus does not rely on any de jure information,
contrary to Ghosh et al. (1997), Eichengreen & Leblang (2003) and Dubas et al. (2005), nor
does it rely on the researcher’s judgment, contrary to Bubula & Atker (2002).
LYS classification main features. LYS classify exchange-rate regimes according to the
behaviour of three variables: interventions in the foreign exchange market, the volatility of the
nominal exchange rate and the volatility of nominal exchange-rate changes. Interventions in
the exchange markets are measured through the volatility of central banks’ foreign reserves.
Idiosyncratic shocks may explain some of the nominal exchange-rate changes; therefore, a
currency’s stability has to be measured according to the volatility of its exchange rate relative
to that of its reserves. The volatility of nominal exchange-rate changes is taken into account
in order to consider policies with a medium-term exchange-rate target, achieved via short-
term objective. In such a procedure, known as a crawling peg, a currency’s exchange rate is
periodically adjusted, but the exchange rate may remain fixed between one adjustment and
the next. Therefore, exchange-rate volatility does not imply volatility of nominal exchange-
rate changes, as opposed to what is observed with a freely floating exchange rate.
Every variable is expressed as a yearly average of monthly data, thus any observation is a
three-dimensional object (one dimension for each variable), related to a given country and a
given year. LYS then apply the K-means partitioning algorithm9 to their dataset in order to
group similar observations into clusters. Once the data have been grouped, each cluster is
associated with an exchange-rate regime.
σ(e) σ(∆e) σ(r)
Flexible High High Low
Crawling Peg High Low High
Fixed Low Low High
Dirty float High High High
Inconclusive Low Low Low
Table 2: LYS classification criteria
To identify the policy regime, LYS assume “the cluster with high volatility of reserves and
low volatility in the nominal exchange-rate identifies the group of fixers. Conversely, the
cluster with low volatility in international reserves and substantial volatility in the nominal
exchange-rate corresponds to countries with flexible arrangements” (LYS 2005, p 1605). The
group with high volatility in the nominal exchange rate and international reserves but low
volatility in nominal exchange-rate changes is made up of those countries with a “crawling
peg”. They add a fourth group, “dirty float”, which “should be associated to the case in which
volatility is relatively high across all variables, with intervention only partially smoothing
9 This method, based on nearest centroid sorting, assigned individual cases to the cluster with the smallest
distance between the case and the center of the cluster.
6
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exchange-rate fluctuations.” (LYS 2005, p 1606). Last, the cluster in which every variable
has low values is labelled “inconclusive”. This group does not match up with any obvious
regime and, therefore, is treated as a special case.
Strengths and weaknesses. The LYS classification method has three main advantages
when compared with other methods. First, exchange-rate movements and foreign exchange
interventions are both considered simultaneously. Second, it is a purely de facto classification;
it does not rely on any de jure component from an official source or any component left to the
author’s discretion. Third, the LYS classification is based on relative definitions, as opposed
to absolute definitions based on thresholds or specific ex ante measurements. Given that the
message delivered by the literature on the “fear of floating” (Reinhart and others) is precisely
that there is no right threshold to define a regime, this is a major factor to be taken into
account when properly defining exchange-rate systems.
Though the LYS regimes classification has become a standard in exchange-rate policy studies,
there are, nevertheless, some limitations that must be taken into account.
Firstly, the classification ends in 2005 and thus does not cover the years of IT sufficiently.
Secondly, and more importantly, the LYS way of dealing with the “inconclusive” cluster is
not convincing. This cluster contains 1,798 out of 2,860 observations. Therefore, more than
60% of the observations are not associated with a policy regime and are passed by in the
initial classification. To resolve this issue, LYS proceed to a second classification: they apply
the same method used for the whole sample during the first round on the single inconclusive
group. However, there is no convincing argument suggesting that the observations labelled
in the first round (for instance, “dirty float”) are similar to those that were given the same
label in the second round. This can be seen clearly when looking at the clusters’ boundaries
in the two rounds. Are the classifications produced from the two rounds really referring to
the same policy realities? This is a major concern. In addition, even after the second round,
a large number of observations (698) still remain in the “inconclusive” cluster. Hence, 25% of
the initial dataset is simply left aside and is not associated with a policy regime10.
Last, even though the K-means algorithm used by LYS to cluster the data has become a
standard in the partitioning literature, it is also known to have several drawbacks. First, the
number of clusters, k, is an input parameter that has to be defined ex ante. Therefore, it is
not exact to say that “cluster analysis has the advantage of avoiding any discretion from the
researcher”11; the researcher has to choose how many groups are to be found in the data.
10 Despite the limitations of the method, it seems that the high number of “inconclusive” cases is due to the
partitioning algorithm and to the extremely large time period and country coverage chosen by the authors.
Their dataset covers any country included in the IMF statistic from 1973 to 2005. Hence, it covers a wide
variety of realities and includes a large number of outliers, most notably among the “inconclusive” observations.
On the other hand, even though they left out less than one in four observations, with such a large coverage
they obtain an interesting and useful classification, seen as a standard in the literature.
11Full quote: “cluster analysis has the advantage of avoiding any discretion from the researcher beyond that
7
Furthermore, LYS do not provide any information about the goodness-of-fit of the number
of groups (k) or of the grouping itself. Another limitation of the partitioning algorithm is
that the results are sensitive to data composition. In the case of LYS, removing only a few
observations may modify the entire classification, which may explain why the inconclusive
countries are not considered as outliers and are excluded from the sample12. Last, clusters
formed by the K-means algorithm have a constrained variance-covariance matrix which gives
them a spherical shape and a similar size (see Hennig 2011). This particularity may explain
the large number of intermediate regimes they obtain.
3 An original method for assessing exchange-rate control
3.1 The approach.
My purpose is to examine whether emerging economies implement similar IT strategies to
developed economies or adopt particular policies, especially with regard to exchange-rate con-
trol through foreign exchange intervention. Therefore, I propose a new classification method,
specifically designed to assess the degree of flexibility of the currencies of inflation-targeting
emerging economies (ITEE).
Two control samples. I consider that two fundamental elements of the LYS method are
good and are to be retained when developing my own approach: first, the use of exchange rate
volatility, the volatility of exchange-rate changes and interventions in the exchange market
to characterise a policy and, second, a partitioning procedure to group the observations into
consistent policy group. I focus on ITEE; therefore, these countries will constitute the core
of my data sample. However, a good classification of exchange-rate arrangements has to be a
relative classification13. Therefore, in order to access the exchange rate arrangement of ITEE,
I must analyse their exchange-rate flexibility relative to that of some other economies. These
control samples are hereafter referred to as “indicator countries” and constitute the counter-
factual economies. However, I require two control samples, one for each polar policy: flexible
and rigid arrangements. The flexible arrangement control sample is made up of developed
IT economies; these economies act as the benchmark for inflation-targeting frameworks asso-
ciated with a flexible exchange-rate regime. Hence, the sample shows whether the exchange
rates of ITEE are as flexible as those of IT developed economies. The fixed arrangement
control sample is made up of economies that have rigid regimes. Finally, my database is the
sum of the ITEE observations, and the flexible and rigid indicator country samples.
required to determine the classifying variables and to assign clusters to different exchange-rate regimes, once
they are identified by the procedure.” Levy-Yeyati & Sturzenegger (2005, page 1610)
12Similarly, k-means may converge to a local minimum, and thus their results are sensible to the initialization
parameters.
13As opposed to an absolute classification, which would be based on thresholds or specific measurements.
8
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Partitioning algorithm. I apply a partitioning algorithm to this database in order to split
the whole set of observations into consistent groups. I show, in the next section, the advantage
of using a Gaussian mixture approach over the K-means algorithm used by LYS. Data are
split according to the likelihood that they belong to a given Gaussian distribution. All the
observations belonging to a Gaussian form one cluster (or one group). Each distribution is
then assumed to be produced by a unique process, which, in turn, is assumed to be a given
exchange-rate regime. The optimal number of clusters and the cluster composition are defined
by statistical criteria and each cluster is then associated with an exchange-rate policy.
Labeling policies. The indicator countries are used to label the groups, so as to associate
a cluster to a monetary policy. For instance, in the case that there are two resulting clusters,
all observations in the group which includes the majority of floating exchange-rate indicator
countries are labelled as de facto floating. Hence, any observation from an IT emerging
economy included in this group will be considered as de facto floating. As there are generally
more than two groups, an “intermediate” regime also has to be considered. The Gaussian
model estimation gives the probability that any given observation belongs to any given cluster;
this is therefore the probability that a given country on a given date has a given policy. Hence,
as opposed to other classifications found in the literature, the aim of my classification scheme
is not to state that a certain country has a certain arrangement: my final result shows the
precise probabilities that a country has a flexible arrangement, a fixed system and a “dirty
float”.
Robustness. An important drawback of partitioning algorithms is their sensitivity to data
composition: a slight change in the data can have a large impact on the results. This is
particularly true in the presence of outliers. To address this issue and ensure the results’
stability, I propose a bootstrapping approach with random sampling. At each iteration the
observations for the ITEE remain in the dataset but the two sets of indicator countries change.
The sets of indicator countries used for a given partition are randomly selected from all the
control observations including both fixed and floating indicator countries. Therefore, the
partition is made over a set of observations consisting in the ITEE, some randomly selected
fixed indicator countries and some randomly selected floating indicator countries. At any
iteration I compute the probability that an ITEE observation belongs to any given policy.
My final result is the average of the probabilities of all iterations, that is, the average of the
results of more than 50,000 partitions; in this way I ensure stability.
3.2 Partitioning through Gaussian mixtures
In order to cluster the observations into consistent group, I estimate a Gaussian mixture
model.
9
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Gaussian mixture definition. Let’s think of the k policy groups obtained with the k-
means clustering method by LYS. One can suppose that there is a Gaussian centered at any
group’ s mean. Thus each cluster can be characterized by a density function, and the overall
dataset can be described by a mixture of all these density functions (plus the probability for
a given observation to belong to one of them). This analysis of a dataset can be done through
a Gaussian mixture model.
The univariate Gaussian distribution is given by
p(x|µ, σ) = 1√
2piσ2
exp
(
− 1
2σ2
(x− µ)2
)
(1)
where the mean µ ∈ R and the variance σ ∈ R+ are the parameters of the distribution.
In my case I have three variables per observations (the nominal exchange-rate volatility,
the interventions in the foreign exchange market and the volatility of nominal exchange-rate
changes). Hence this is a “trivariate” case. When the Gaussian distribution is extended to
more than one distribution, it is given by:
p(x|µ,Σ) = 1
(2pi)d/2|Σ|1/2 exp
(
−1
2
(x− µ)>Σ−1(x− µ)
)
(2)
where d (equals 3) is the number of distributions. In the multivariate case the mean is a
vector, µ ∈ Rd, and the covariance is a positive definite matrix, Σ ∈ Sd .
For a given set of m observations, x = {x1, ..., xM} that are assumed i.i.d and drawn from a
multivariate Gaussian, the distribution’s log-likelihood is:
p(x|µ,Σ) = −Md
2
log(2pi)− M
2
log|Σ| − 1
2
M∑
m=1
(xm − µ)>Σ−1(xm − µ) (3)
By definition a Gaussian distribution is unimodal. If assuming k groups in the dataset, a
combination of k Gaussians into a Gaussian Mixture Model is to be considered. With a mixing
coefficient denoted by pi ∈ RK and satisfying any pik ≥ 0 and
∑K
k=1 pik = 1, the Gaussian
mixture model is then given by:
p(x|pi, µ,Σ) =
K∑
k=1
pikN (x|µk,Σk) (4)
where µ = {µ1, ..., µK} and Σ = {Σ1, ...,ΣK} are the mean and variance of the respective
Gaussian distributions (N , as in equation (2)). 14
The log-likelihood associated to this model (for m points, assuming independance) can be
14 Since the observations are assumed to be independently distributed, equation (4) may be written as:
p(x|pi, µ,Σ) =∏Mm=1∑Kk=1 pikN (xm|µk,Σk)
10
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written as
log p(X|pi, µ,Σ) =
M∑
m=1
log
K∑
k=1
pikN (xm|µk,Σk) (5)
Once the parameters estimates have been obtained, the a posteriori probability that an
observation m belongs to the group k can be deduced:
pim,k =
pikN (xm|µk,Σk)∑
k′ pik′N (xm|µk′ ,Σk′)
(6)
In this paper, pim,k is the probability that an observation m, for example Brazil in 2010,
belongs to a group k, for example free floating exchange-rate group. Also, the sum of pim,k
and pim,k′ equals 1. In that example, k′ stands for fixed and intermediate exchange-rate
groups.
Variance decomposition. This general expression of the Gaussian mixture model allows
some sophistications. In particular, the covariance matrix can be decomposed into different
variables on which a large set of constraints can be applied.
Following Banfield & Raftery (1993) a spectral decomposition of the covariance matrix is
given by:
Σk = λkDkAkD
>
k (7)
for k = 1, ...,K and where
• (λk1, ..., λkd) are the matrix eigenvalues with λ = Πdm=1(λmk)1/d.
• Dk is the matrice of eigenvectors .
• Ak is a diagonal matrix whose elements are proportional to the eigenvalues, that is
Ak =
1
λk
diag(λk1, ..., λkd) and detAk = 1.
This decomposition of Σk allows to characterize the distribution: Dk gives the orientation
of the covariance matrix, Ak specifies the shape of the density contours and λk determines
the volume of the corresponding ellipsoid (or hypervolume). These three characteristics (ori-
entation, volume and shape) can be estimated from the data, and can be allowed to vary
between clusters, or constrained to be the same for all clusters can vary between clusters, or
be constrained as the same for all clusters.
Celeux & Govaert (1995) have discribed the different model that can be obtained by con-
straining the orientation, volume and shape of the covariance matrix. They also provide
11
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details on the EM algorithm for the maximum likelihood estimation of these models. Fraley
et al. (2012) (see also Fraley & Raftery 2007) proposed a computational methodology for
some of them. In this paper I focus on the multidimensional case considering three options :
to be equal among clusters, to vary among clusters, to be given by the identity matrix. Also
I use Fraley et al. (2012) denomination system: a 3 letters code, with 1 letter for each of the
3 characteristics (volume, shape and orientation)15. The different model of the covariance
matrix for which a computational method is known are summarized in Table 3 and I keep
referring to this name system in the section dedicated to the results, in particular see Graph 2
page 17.
A criteria to choose the number of clusters. The choice of the number of components
has to be done according to the quality of the fit of the estimated density and the detection
of distinct groups. A particularly simple and viable method consists in choosing the value of
K which minimizes the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), as difined by Schwarz (1978).
BIC = −2 l̂ + w log n (8)
where l̂ is the estimated log-likelihood, n is the number of observations, and the term w
corresponds to the number of parameters to be estimated (w = 3K− 1) in the bivariate case.
From k-means to Gaussian mixture. In the Appendix B page 33, I show how the
Gaussian mixture differs from the K-means algorithm used by Levy-Yeyati & Sturzenegger
(2005). Indeed, the K-means used by LYS is similar to the Gaussian distribution, but there
15For example EVI denotes a model in which the volumes of all clusters are equal (E), the shapes of the
clusters may vary (V), and the orientation is the identity (I). Clusters in this model have diagonal covariances
with orientation parallel to the coordinate axes.
Table 3: Possible parameterizations of the covariance matrix Σj for multidimensional data.
Model name Form Distribution Volume Shape Orientation
EII λI Spherical Equal Equal NA
VII λjI Spherical Variable Equal NA
EEI λA Diagonal Equal Equal Coordinate axes
VEI λjA Diagonal Variable Equal Coordinate axes
EVI λAj Diagonal Equal Variable Coordinate axes
VVI λjAj Diagonal Variable Variable Coordinate axes
EEE λDADT Ellipsoidal Equal Equal Equal
EEV λDjADTj Ellipsoidal Equal Equal Variable
VEV λjDjADTj Ellipsoidal Variable Equal Variable
VVV λjDjAjDTj Ellipsoidal Variable Variable Variable
Source: Fraley & Raftery (2007, page 8).
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are two limitations: the covariance matrix is constrained and the probability of belonging
to a given group is not computed. The covariance matrix constraint gives the clusters their
spherical shape and all clusters are of a similar size; this may be a problem because it also
creates policy groups of a similar size. Therefore, it can be argued that intermediate regimes
are as important as polar regimes. This may be right; however, the algorithm used by LYS
creates an important bias towards that result. Also, when adopting their approach, the
probability of an observation belonging to a certain group is not computed. An observation
either belongs to a group or it does not, whereas, in my approach, the clusters’ shape is
flexible and the precise probability of belonging to a group is computed. This avoids stating
that a country has a fixed or floating arrangement and instead gives the probability that a
country has a fixed or floating arrangement. All in all, the Gaussian mixture approach seems
to be more flexible and robust than the K-means approach.
4 Data
4.1 Data coverage.
My dataset is made up of 75 countries, including 28 IT countries, of which 19 are emerging
economies and 9 are developed economies. I use the list of IT countries produced by the Bank
of England (BoE) in a paper based on a broad set of indicators, which is very well documented
(see Hammond 2012. Also related are Mishkin 2004 and Roger 2009, among others). The
essential elements that define an inflation-targeting regime are:
• Price stability is explicitly recognised as the main goal of monetary policy;
• There is a public announcement of a quantitative target for inflation;
• Monetary policy is based on a wide set of information including an inflation forecast;
• Transparency;
• Accountability mechanisms.
To define the rigid regime indicator countries, I follow the IMF classification (see “Classifi-
cation of Exchange Rate Arrangements and Monetary Policy Frameworks”, IMF website). I
consider two items: “currency board arrangements” and “other conventional fixed peg arrange-
ments against a single currency”16. I obtain 47 indicator countries for the fixed exchange-rate
benchmark. Information about the dataset is summarised in the Appendix A page 31. The
16There are plenty of different rigid exchange rates families. My fixed exchange rates control sample takes
a broad definition. It includes a lot of countries having various degrees of rigidity. Therefore, the robustness
and stability of my result is insured through the boot-strapping estimation method.
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number of floating indicators and rigid indicators is balanced through the bootstrapping
method, which selects similar subsamples.
I use monthly data from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics over the period 1990-
2012. This is the widest range possible since the first country which adopted IT, New Zealand,
did so in December 1989. For every country, I only consider the years after IT was imple-
mented. The starting dates of IT come from the BoE’s Handbook on IT (Hammond 2012)
and correspond, by and large, to the date declared by the central banks, also known as the
“default starting dates” in Rose (2007)’s terminology. I follow Levy-Yeyati & Sturzenegger
(2003) and Levy-Yeyati & Sturzenegger (2005) for the definition and computation of the three
variables:
• Exchange-rate volatility (σe), measured as the average of the absolute monthly log
changes in the nominal exchange rate relative to the relevant anchor currency over the
year.
• The volatility of exchange-rate changes (σ∆e), measured as the standard deviation of
the monthly log change in the exchange rate.
• Interventions in the exchange markets, measured as central banks’ foreign reserve volatil-
ity (σr), that is, the average of the absolute monthly log change in dollar-denominated
international reserves relative to the log change in the value of the monetary base.
Each variable is expressed as a yearly average (of monthly data), thus an observation is a
three dimensional object related to a given country and a given year in the (σe , σ∆e , σr)
space.
Random sampling. After computing the three variables, I discarded an observation where
I lacked data for at least one of the classifying variables. I obtain 1,035 country-year data
points: 154 for floating exchange-rate indicator countries, 603 for fixed exchange-rate indicator
countries and 278 for the inflation-targeting emerging economies.
The difference in size of the two control sample does not pose any problems because it will
be corrected by a repetitive random sampling process. This approach consists in estimating
the Gaussian mixture model multiple times, each time with a different counterfactual sam-
ple composed of observations randomly selected from the two indicator countries’ datasets.
Hence, the Gaussian mixture model is estimated using a sample made up of all points for
inflation-targeting emerging economies, and 2x points for indicator countries, among which x
points are randomly chosen from observations for floating exchange-rate indicator countries
and x points are randomly chosen from those for fixed exchange-rate indicator countries. The
variable x takes any value from 100 to the size of the smallest indicator country’s sample. The
process is complete after more than 50,000 iterations. In other words, the Gaussian mixture
model is estimated with more than 50,000 different data samples.
14
4.2 Partitionning loop.
The classification process is based on the following loop:
• Step 1: Random composition of the control sample. A given number of observations
are randomly selected among the two sets of indicator countries in order to create the
control sample. When added to the ITEE observations, they make up the dataset for
one iteration (see Graph 1 page 16).
• Step 2: Gaussian mixture model estimation. The Gaussian mixture model is estimated.
The BIC criterion maximisation gives the best variance-covariance decomposition model
and the optimal number of Gaussians that are mixed into the model (see Graph 2 and
Graph 3 page 17). Only the optimal distribution is taken into account. The probability
of any ITEE observation belonging to any Gaussian is computed.
• Step 3: Exchange-rate arrangement classification. All observations belonging to one
Gaussian are assumed to form one group (or cluster). That cluster is then assigned
to an exchange-rate regime according to the indicator countries’ position (see Graph 4
page 18). The probability of any ITEE observation belonging to any Gaussian can now
be read as the probability of having a monetary regime.
15
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2013.74
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
 
σ(r)σ(e)
 
σ
 
(∆
 
e
)
Base (EEIT)
Random1 (DEIT)
Random2 (Peg)
Figure 1: Random composition of the data sample (Step 1).
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Figure 2: Identification of the optimal model and number of Gaussians (Step 2).
Figure 3: Correspondance between the optimal number of Gaussians and the number of modes
appearing on the join density.
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Figure 4: Labelling clusters as de facto regimes (Step 3).
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5 Results
5.1 Three exchange-rate flexibility degrees: floating, intermediate and
fixed.
When the Gaussian mixture model is estimated in step 2, it gives the optimal number of
partitions (generally three). Therefore, three degrees of exchange-rate flexibility are to be
considered in step 3 when labelling the clusters as fixed, floating or intermediate exchange-
rate arrangements. The procedure is the following: if the majority of a Gaussian’s elements
come from the floating exchange-rate indicator countries, the Gaussian label is “de facto
floating exchange-rate arrangement”, and the probability of any observation belonging to that
Gaussian is seen as the probability of having a de facto floating exchange-rate arrangement.
The same reasoning holds for fixed exchange-rate arrangements. If there is a third group, it
is labelled as “de facto intermediate exchange-rate arrangement”. As we will see below, this
group stands for managed floating or “dirty float” regimes. The process described above is
repeated thousands of times with different, randomly composed, indicator country samples
and the final result (shown below) is, for any observation, the average probability of each
iteration.
Table 4: Classification: summary statistics
Fixed
σ(e) σ(∆e) σ(r)
min 0.2 0.2 0.2
mean 1.0 1.0 1.0
max 1.7 1.7 2.1
std 1.0 1.0 1.0
Intermediate
σ(e) σ(∆e) σ(r)
min 0.1 0.1 1.4
mean 1.9 1.9 2.4
max 3.8 3.9 4.6
std 2.1 2.3 1.7
Floating
σ(e) σ(∆e) σ(r)
min 0.5 0.1 0.2
mean 3.4 3.1 1.2
max 8.8 9.6 4.4
std 4.2 4.5 2.2
Values are expressed relatively to the mean
and std of the fixed exchange rate arrangement group.
Table 4 summarises the main statistics that characterise the three policy groups. Values are
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expressed relative to the mean (and standard deviation) of the fixed exchange-rate arrange-
ment group for each variable. For example, looking at the means in first column, we can see
that the nominal exchange-rate volatility, σ(e), in the intermediate group is, on average, 90%
greater than in the rigid exchange rate group, whereas it is 3.5 times higher in the floating
group than in the rigid exchange-rate group. The standard deviation captures the average
distance between the observations of a cluster and the cluster’s centroid (or centre). The fixed
exchange rate arrangement group displays the lowest standard deviation value for σ(e), which
means that countries in this group have similar nominal exchange rate volatilities. On the
other side, the floating arrangement cluster has a large standard deviation for σ(e), meaning
that exchange-rate volatilities in this group are much more heterogeneous.
The second column shows the values for the volatility of exchange-rate changes, σ(∆e). The
ranking and values are quite similar to those in the first column, which indicates the possibility
of a strong correlation between the two variables. The absence of a cluster with large σ(e),
and σ(r), and low σ(∆e)) (as in Table 2 page 6) indicates that there is no such behaviour as a
crawling peg. This also supports the argument that the intermediate group should be seen as
a “dirty-float” or “managed-float” system, or, in other words, a floating system with frequent
interventions in the foreign exchange market.
This idea is confirmed by the figures in the third column, dedicated to σ(r), the intervention
in the foreign exchange market. The mean values for the floating and fixed arrangement
groups are almost the same, while the mean of the intermediate group is very large. Once
again, this indicates that the intermediate group matches up with a managed float strategy
where there are large-scale exchange market interventions.
5.2 Results at the country level
The results for individual countries are given in the Appendix C page 37. For instance,
in 1999, there is a 98% probability of Chile having a floating exchange rate according to
Table C.11 (page 39). Consistently, there is a 2% probability of it having an intermediate
exchange-rate arrangement (page 38) and a null probability (0%) of it having a fixed exchange
rate (page 37). In other words, the probability of Chile’s exchange rate being as flexible
as that of developed IT economies in 1999 was 98%, while the probability of it being as
controlled as that of fixed exchange-rate economies was null. This does not mean that Chile
never tried to control its exchange rate or that foreign exchange market interventions never
happened in Chile. Chile’s monetary authorities may have intervened in the foreign exchange
market, but the results seem to indicate that if they did, they did it to a similar extent as IT
developed central banks. Another example is given by the same country seven years later. In
2006, the probability of Chile having a fixed exchange rate arrangement was still very low:
2%. Therefore, Chile’s exchange rate policy was, by no comparison, similar to that of the
monetary authorities of the pegged currencies. However, the most probable arrangement is no
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longer the same: the probability of having a floating system has decreased to below one third
(27%), while the probability of having an intermediate exchange-rate arrangement has risen
to 71%. This does not mean that Chile had a controlled exchange rate in 2006, but rather
it indicates that there is strong evidence to show that Chile’s exchange market interventions
were carried out on a broader scale than in developed countries.
An overview of the results at the country level is presented in Table 6 page 23 and Table 5
page 22.
Table 6 gives, for any country, the average probabilities of the three degrees of exchange-
rate flexibility (for all years since the country adopted IT). The most probable exchange rate
arrangement is a floating system. As can be seen in the last row of the table, the probability
of an inflation-targeting emerging economy having a floating exchange rate is 52%. This
figure may appear quite balanced. However, looking at the country level clearly indicates
that the most probable degree of flexibility is that of having a floating arrangement: across
the 19 ITEE, the probability of having a floating arrangement is the highest for 14 countries.
Only three countries are most likely to have a fixed exchange rate arrangement: Albania,
Guatemala and Peru (with an overall probability of 20%). Finally, Brazil and Hungary are
most likely associated with an intermediate system (with an overall probability of 28%).
The finding that most observations show a floating exchange rate was to be expected. The-
oretically, the definition of inflation-targeting implies that the focus is only on price stability
and, therefore, the exchange rate is allowed to float. The finding that 28% of the observations
are associated with an intermediate arrangement is also not surprising: a large body of litera-
ture has shown that monetary authorities try to reduce exchange rate volatility, most notably
in emerging economies. This is the well-known “fear of floating” phenomenon. However, the
share of the most rigid arrangements, 20%, is unexpectedly high. One in five ITEE exchange-
rate observations is most probably as rigid as an exchange rate with a peg. Theoretically
speaking, the issue of inflation-targeting under such circumstances should be questioned.
Focusing on the highest probability for each year, Table 5 page 22 summarises the number
of years associated with each degree of flexibility for all countries. The table portrays the
same phenomenon as the previous one: a floating system appears to be the most probable
arrangement. It is associated with approximately half of the sample: 101 observations out of
197. This result is emphasised at the country level; floating arrangements occur most often
in 12 out of 19 countries.
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Table 5: Exchange-rate arrangements occurrences
Number of years with Years Covered
Fix Intermediate Float
ALBANIA 3 1 0 4
ARMENIA 0 1 6 7
BRAZIL 0 6 8 14
CHILE 0 4 10 14
COLOMBIA 2 2 10 14
CZECH REPUBLIC 3 2 9 14
GHANA 2 1 3 6
GUATEMALA 6 2 0 8
HUNGARY 0 9 3 12
INDONESIA 1 3 4 8
MEXICO 1 5 6 12
PERU 7 2 2 11
PHILIPPINES 5 4 2 11
POLAND 0 4 10 14
ROMANIA 4 1 3 8
SERBIA, REPUBLIC OF 1 3 3 7
SOUTH AFRICA 0 1 12 13
THAILAND 6 4 3 13
TURKEY 0 0 7 7
Total 41 55 101 197
Exchange-rate flexibility degree based on the most probable regime.
5.3 From flexibility degrees to IT regimes
While looking at the main results on the three degrees of flexibility, it may appear paradoxical
that the overall probability of having a floating system is approximately one half, while it is
the most probable arrangement for three-quarters of the countries considered. To reconcile
these two dimensions, I propose to focus on the monetary regime implied by exchange-rate
flexibility. The sample is made up of countries that fulfil the standard criterion defining IT:
explicitly committing to a publicly announced inflation target. Therefore, the main question
to be asked in order to define the monetary regime of these countries is: do these countries
have only one target, price stability, or do they also target exchange-rate stability?
To answer this question, I will consider two inflation-targeting regimes, distinguished by the
role played by the exchange rate: flexible inflation-targeting and hybrid inflation-targeting.
Flexible inflation-targeting corresponds to the standard definition: a monetary framework
in which price stability is explicitly recognised as the main goal of monetary policy. Within
this framework, the Tinbergen’s principle holds: the central bank has one objective and only
one instrument, the interest rate. Although “flexible” inflation-targeting refers to Svensson’s
well-known IT definition17, in the context of this paper, “flexible” also refers to the degree of
17“Flexible inflation-targeting means that monetary policy aims at stabilizing both inflation around the
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flexibility.
Proposition: Under hybrid inflation-targeting, aside from the goal of price stabil-
ity and the tool with which to achieve this goal, interest rate setting, the central
bank aims to manage the exchange rate through exchange market interventions.
Table 6: Inflation-targeting regime based on exchange-rate flexibility degree.
Arrangement probability IT regime
Fix Intermediate Float
ALBANIA 0.59 0.28 0.13 Hybrid IT
ARMENIA 0.04 0.29 0.67 Flexible IT
BRAZIL 0.04 0.51 0.45 Hybrid IT
CHILE 0.04 0.32 0.64 Flexible IT
COLOMBIA 0.13 0.17 0.70 Flexible IT
CZECH REPUBLIC 0.28 0.17 0.55 Flexible IT
GHANA 0.32 0.28 0.41 Hybrid IT
GUATEMALA 0.62 0.21 0.16 Hybrid IT
HUNGARY 0.10 0.51 0.39 Hybrid IT
INDONESIA 0.19 0.25 0.56 Flexible IT
MEXICO 0.20 0.29 0.51 Flexible IT
PERU 0.56 0.20 0.24 Hybrid IT
PHILIPPINES 0.35 0.29 0.37 Hybrid IT
POLAND 0.05 0.27 0.68 Flexible IT
ROMANIA 0.38 0.21 0.42 Hybrid IT
SERBIA, REPUBLIC OF 0.11 0.33 0.56 Flexible IT
SOUTH AFRICA 0.03 0.21 0.76 Flexible IT
THAILAND 0.32 0.26 0.42 Hybrid IT
TURKEY 0.02 0.22 0.76 Flexible IT
All countries 0.20 0.28 0.52
To distinguish countries under the flexible IT regime from those under hybrid IT18, the
following rule is assumed: if the probability of having a flexible system is higher than the sum
of the probabilities of all other systems, the country has a flexible inflation-targeting regime;
otherwise, it has a hybrid IT regime.
The results are given in the last column of Table 6 page 23. Ten countries are found to have a
flexible inflation-targeting regime: Armenia, Chile, Colombia, the Czech Republic, Indonesia,
Mexico Poland, Serbia, South Africa and Turkey. The remaining nine have a hybrid IT
inflation target and the real economy, whereas strict inflation-targeting aims at stabilizing inflation only,
without regard to the stability of the real economy, what Mervyn King (1997) has described as being an
“inflation nutter”. ” in Svensson (2010, page 1).
18“Hybrid inflation-targeting regimes” is also the title of a paper by Roger et al. (2009). In this paper, the
authors examine whether including the exchange rate explicitly in the central bank’s reaction function can
improve macroeconomic performance using a DSGE model. They call hybrid inflation-targeting regimes those
in which the central bank reacts to the exchange rate or controls the exchange rate, as opposed to “plain
vanilla IT”.
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regime: Albania, Brazil, Ghana, Guatemala, Hungary, Peru, the Philippines, Romania and
Thailand.
The large number of hybrid IT regimes confirms that inflation-targeting cannot be imple-
mented in emerging economies in the same way as it is implemented in developed coun-
tries. Countries with a hybrid IT regime have adapted IT to suit their specific requirements.
However, the large number of flexible IT regimes confirms the theoretical views on inflation-
targeting: IT may lead to greater exchange-rate flexibility than that generally seen in emerging
economies.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, I ask whether emerging economies implement a “flexible” inflation-targeting
strategy, with one goal (price stability) and one tool (short interest rate), or a “hybrid” IT
strategy, mixing two goals (price stability and exchange rate stability) and two instruments
(short interest rate and foreign exchange market interventions).
In answer to this question, this paper offers a new exchange-rate regime classification method,
which relies on three variables: the nominal exchange-rate volatility, the volatility of nominal
exchange-rate change and interventions in the foreign exchange markets.
This method shows a clear improvement on the existing one and on that proposed by Levy-
Yeyati & Sturzenegger (2005). I show that the LYS method is a constrained form of the
algorithm I use. This constraint creates a bias towards intermediate regimes in the LYS
paper, whereas my approach is more flexible and relies on an explicit criterion to define the
quality of fit and the number of policy groups observed in the data.
The stability and robustness of my results is ensured through a bootstrapping loop using a
random sample composition process. Move from statistical characteristics to policy behaviour,
I use two control samples: one with IT developed countries and flexible exchange rates and
another with countries with controlled exchange rates. A Gaussian mixture model is estimated
to cluster the data into consistent groups and the control samples are used to label the different
groups of IT emerging economies.
Across the 19 emerging economies that have adopted inflation targeting, I find clear evidence
that 12 have an exchange rate which is as flexible as that of the IT developed economies.
This does not mean that these countries never intervene in the foreign exchange market, but
rather that if they do ever intervene, the impact on their exchange rate is similar to that
on the rate in developed economies. Among the remainders, three have a managed float
arrangement while the remaining four have an exchange-rate system as rigid as the standard
peg currencies.
The probability of a country having a perfectly flexible arrangement is 52%, while the proba-
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bility of having a managed float system obtained through foreign exchange market intervention
is 28%, and that of having a rigid exchange-rate system (similar to those of pegged currencies)
is 20%.
The results can also been sumarized by seeing evidence of two different monetary regimes
under inflation targeting: flexible IT when the monetary authorities handle only one tool, the
interest rate, and hybrid IT when the monetary authorities add foreign exchange interventions
to their toolbox. Finally, flexible inflation-targeting prevails in ten countries and appears to
be the main strategy.
Last, the probability of the exchange rate regime computed for the emerging economies
that target inflation and presented in this paper can be used for many other purposes. For
example, the database created for this paper can be used to test the relevance of the currency
mismatches hypothesis (see Eichengreen et al. 2007 and Hausmann & Panizza 2011) as a
determinant of exchange rate regime choice in emerging economies. Also, the probability of
having a floating exchange rate can be seen as one of the Trilemma variables, that goes along
Chinn & Ito (2008) capital openness index and Aizenman et al. (2010) monetary independence
index.
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A Data Appendix
Data set
The currency of reference of each country is used as numeraire to express the nominal exchange
rate value. It is either the US dollar or the Euro. The list of inflation targeting countries
consists of emerging economies (Status = emerging) and developed economies (Status =
developed). Developed economies are used in the control sample as indicator of flexible
exchange-rates policies while we assess emerging economies exchange-rate arrangement. Fix
exchange-rate countries are the counterpart of developed IT countries: they are used in the
control sample as indicator of fix exchange-rates policies (and they display how flexible can
be an exchange rate arrangement in an IT country).
Table A.7: Inflation targeting countries
Country IT adoption Status Numeraire
Albania 2009 emerging EUR
Armenia 2006 emerging EUR
Australia 1993 developed USD
Brazil 1999 emerging USD
Canada 1991 developed USD
Chile 1999 emerging USD
Colombia 1999 emerging USD
Czech Rep. 1998 emerging EUR
Ghana 2007 emerging USD
Guatemala 2005 emerging USD
Hungary 2001 emerging EUR
Iceland 2001 developed EUR
Indonesia 2005 emerging USD
Israel 1997 developed USD
Korea 2001 developed USD
Mexico 2001 emerging USD
New Zealand 1990 developed USD
Norway 2001 developed EUR
Peru 2002 emerging USD
Philippines 2002 emerging USD
Poland 1998 emerging EUR
Romania 2005 emerging EUR
Serbia 2006 emerging EUR
South Africa 2000 emerging USD
Sweden 1993 developed EUR
Thailand 2000 emerging USD
Turkey 2006 emerging USD
United Kingdom 1992 developed EUR
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Table A.8: Fix exchange-rate countries
Country Numeraire Country Numeraire
Aruba USD Lesotho USD
Bahamas, The USD Lithuania EUR
Bahrain, Kingdom of USD Macedonia, FYR EUR
Barbados USD Malaysia USD
Belize USD Maldives USD
Bhutan USD Namibia USD
Bolivia USD Nepal USD
Bosnia & Herz. EUR Netherlands Antilles USD
Brunei Dar. USD Oman USD
Bulgaria EUR Qatar USD
Cape Verde USD Saudi Arabia USD
China USD Seychelles USD
Comoros USD Slovenia EUR
Croatia EUR Suriname USD
Djibouti USD Swaziland USD
Eritrea USD Syrian Arab Rep. USD
Estonia EUR Tanzania USD
Guinea USD Turkmenistan USD
Hong Kong USD Ukraine USD
Iraq USD United Arab Emirates USD
Jordan USD Venezuela, Rep. USD
Kazakhstan USD WAEMU EUR
Kuwait USD Zimbabwe USD
Lebanon USD
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B Methodological Appendix
In this methodological appendix, I show how the Gaussian mixture model used in this paper
differ from the K-means alogorithm used by Levy-Yeyati & Sturzenegger (2005). LYS’ k-
means is closed to the Gaussian approach, but it assumes two technical limitations that may
have a large impact on the final results and on their interpretations.
Technically, the covariance matrix is constrained and the probability of belonging to a group
is led to a binary variable. This constraint on the covariance matrix gives to their clusters a
circular shape, and all clusters are being of similar size. This may create an important bias
for their results. In particular, because all groups are large and of similar size, they can only
conclude that the intermediate group is as big as the other groups, and reject the bipolar
theory. In my approach the clusters’ shape is flexible and therefore it avoids constraining the
groups to be of similar size
Also, in LYS approach, a country is for example either floating or pegging19. In my classifi-
cation scheme, a precise probability to belong to a group is computed. Therefore, a country
is not either floating or pegging, but it has a probability of being floating and a probability
of being pegging. All in all, the Gaussian mixture approach I propose is more flexible and
robust than those with k-means.
K-means cluster analysis
The K-means algorithm is a clustering method, which is used to divide a set of objects into
groups, called clusters, such that objects within a group tend to be more similar, or closed,
to one another as compare to objects belonging to different goups. As simply said by Wu &
Kumar (2010, page 21) “clustering algorithms place similar points in the same cluster while
placing dissimilar points in different clusters”. It was independently discovered by Steinhaus
(1956) and Lloyd (1982) (Unpublished Bell Lab. Note of 1957, see Jain (2010) for a wider
historical perspective).
Let X = x1, x2, ..., xM be a set of M d-dimensional points, to be clustered into a set of K
clusters, denoted by C = c1, c2, ..., cK . K-means algorithm finds a partition such that the
within-cluster sum of squares is minimized. Let µk be the mean of cluster ck. The default
measure of closeness is the Euclidean distance. Thus, the squared error between µk and the
points in cluster ck is given by:
J(cK) =
∑
xm∈ck
||xm − µk||2 (9)
19There are more precisely 4 alternative policies in LYS approach.
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The K-means algorithm minimizes the within-cluster sum of squares over all K clusters:
arg min
K∑
k=1
∑
xm∈ck
||xm − µk||2 (10)
The cluster means, µk with k = 1, 2...,K, also called cluster centroids, allow to represents
each of the k clusters by a single point in Rd As described by Levy-Yeyati & Sturzenegger
(2005, page 8), “K cases in the data file, where K is the number of clusters requested, are
selected as temporary centers. As subsequent cases are processed, a case replaces a center if
the smallest distance to a center is greater than the distance between the two closest centers.
The center that is closer to the case is replaced. A case also replaces a center if the smallest
distance from the case to a center is larger than the smallest distance between the center and
all other centers. Again, it replaces the center closest to it. The procedure continues until all
cases are classified.”
The K-means algorithm clusters in an iterative fashion, alternating between reassigning the
cluster of all points, and updating the empirical mean of each cluster. The main steps of
K-means algorithm are as follows (see Jain & Dubes 1988)
• Select an initial partition with K clusters,
• Assignment step: generate a new partition by assigning each observation to the cluster
with the closest mean
C
(t)
k = {xm : ||xm − µk|| ≤ ||xm − µ(t)k∗ || (11)
where (t) represents the iterative step, for all k∗ = 1, ...,K
• Update step: Calculate the new means to be the centroid of the observations in the
cluster.
µ
(t+1)
k =
1
c
(t)
k
∑
xm∈c(t)k
xm (12)
• Repeat assignment and update steps until cluster membership stabilizes.
The algorithm converges when the assignments, and hence the centroids values, no longer
change. One can show that the objective function defined in equation (10) will decrease
whenever there is a change in the assignment or the relocation steps, and convergence is
guaranteed in a finite number of iterations.
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From k-means to Gaussian mixture
The k-means are similar to the Gaussian mixture model, but it supposed a constained covari-
ance matrix and a bi-modal probability of belonging to a group.
Following Vishwanathan (2011), let assume that the covariances of the mixture components
are given by Σm = Id, where  > 0 and Id denotes the identity matrix. In this case the
univariate Gaussian distribution given by equation (1) reduces to
N (x|µ, I) = 1√
2pi
exp
(
− 1
2
||x− µ||2
)
(13)
Then, equation (6) can be written as :
pim,k =
pik exp
(− 12 ||xm − µk||2)∑
k′ pik′ exp
(− 12 ||xm − µk′ ||2) (14)
Let µk′ denotes the µ that minimizes ||xm − µ|| (that is µk′ is the closest µ to xm. If one
assume → 0 then pim,k → 0 for all k except for k′, and pim,k′ → 1 for j′ .
Let rm,k be defined as:
pim,k =
1 ifk = argmink′ ||xm − µk′ ||20 otherwise
Then, we can rewrite equation (9) which minimizes within-cluster sum of square over all
cluster k, in term of Gaussian mixture model’s equation (4), as:
J(pi, µ) =
m∑
m=1
K∑
k=1
pim,k||xm − µk||2 (15)
This is equivalent to add a binary parameter in the minimizing within-cluster sum of squares,
as defined by equation (9) and (10) and thus, this is equivalent to the K-means algorithm .
To resume, I have express the k-means algorithm as a form of Gaussian mixture model.
This was done by assuming that the covariance matrice of the mixture components was
constrained, with equal variance among the groups. This is equivalent to the model EII in
Table 3. Therefore, I can consider that the k-means problem as defined by Levy-Yeyati &
Sturzenegger (2005) for grouping monetary regimes, is a particular case of the more general
gaussian mixture problem I handle here. Futhermore classifying exchange-rate regimes using
the Gaussian mixture model approach, gives, first, a criterium to determine the number of
clusters, and then, the best fit among various model. In particular it allows my clusters to
be ellipsoidal and not constraint to circles like in LYS. To illustrate this outcome, I plot on
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Graph B.5 page 36 the clusters obtained with LYS approach, using exactly the same sample
as in Section 4, Graph 4 page 18
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Figure B.5: Step 3 following Levy-Yeyati & Sturzenegger (2005) approach.
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C Results Appendix
Table C.9: Probability of having a fix exchange-rate arrangement
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
ALBANIA 0 90 58 90
ARMENIA 1 1 2 5 2 0 19
BRAZIL 0 9 4 5 4 0 3 9 0 5 5 9 3 2
CHILE 0 5 0 12 0 0 13 2 14 5 1 1 8 2
COLOMBIA 0 0 56 0 27 0 88 2 0 4 0 0 3 1
CZECH REPUBLIC 1 23 17 12 76 100 43 11 20 1 0 43 19 32
GHANA 100 4 2 0 79 4
GUATEMALA 88 96 100 43 17 12 53 88
HUNGARY 8 24 10 16 17 3 17 0 2 14 0 6
INDONESIA 2 18 9 5 0 31 53 35
MEXICO 9 100 0 26 30 11 36 5 0 15 2 6
PERU 76 84 100 17 71 5 0 7 92 65 100
PHILIPPINES 61 12 18 61 0 0 2 53 21 74 79
POLAND 1 0 1 0 2 1 18 12 15 3 0 2 2 11
ROMANIA 0 66 9 1 1 76 67 81
SERBIA, REPUBLIC OF 44 17 1 1 0 16 0
SOUTH AFRICA 0 0 1 5 5 1 5 8 5 5 0 0 1
THAILAND 0 15 48 40 2 51 1 79 21 78 14 17 54
TURKEY 2 3 5 0 0 4 0
De facto regime probability, such that for a country and for a year, the probability of having a fixed + an intermediate + a floating
arrangement = 1. Period displayed: after IT adoption.
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Table C.10: Probability of having an intermediate exchange-rate arrangement
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
ALBANIA 100 1 7 2
ARMENIA 7 6 13 37 14 100 23
BRAZIL 0 64 41 36 40 100 46 64 100 36 34 49 47 56
CHILE 2 8 3 61 100 5 18 71 60 35 6 29 40 7
COLOMBIA 4 2 5 5 10 1 2 51 5 43 0 3 69 36
CZECH REPUBLIC 16 52 57 34 2 0 16 6 11 15 6 7 9 8
GHANA 0 43 55 15 10 43
GUATEMALA 1 1 0 32 43 62 29 3
HUNGARY 65 9 64 58 57 8 57 6 62 60 100 67
INDONESIA 5 49 12 36 4 45 5 42
MEXICO 16 0 3 47 6 63 37 36 5 60 18 59
PERU 7 10 0 26 3 52 100 12 1 3 0
PHILIPPINES 4 62 59 5 2 100 8 11 53 11 2
POLAND 6 3 10 5 49 64 52 10 59 48 0 8 8 62
ROMANIA 100 4 32 10 8 2 4 5
SERBIA, REPUBLIC OF 33 58 12 65 1 58 4
SOUTH AFRICA 4 0 11 36 35 6 38 63 36 36 4 3 7
THAILAND 1 59 18 37 7 11 68 6 49 4 61 7 6
TURKEY 16 46 35 6 3 41 7
De facto regime probability, such that for a country and for a year, the probability of having a fixed + an intermediate + a floating
arrangement = 1. Period displayed: after IT adoption.
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Table C.11: Probability of having a floating exchange-rate arrangement
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
ALBANIA 0 9 35 8
ARMENIA 92 92 85 58 85 0 58
BRAZIL 100 27 54 59 56 0 51 26 0 59 61 42 50 42
CHILE 98 87 97 27 0 94 68 27 26 59 93 71 52 91
COLOMBIA 96 98 39 95 63 99 10 47 94 53 100 97 28 63
CZECH REPUBLIC 83 25 26 54 22 0 41 83 69 84 94 50 72 60
GHANA 0 54 43 85 10 54
GUATEMALA 11 3 0 25 40 26 18 8
HUNGARY 27 67 27 26 26 89 26 93 36 26 0 27
INDONESIA 93 32 78 59 96 24 41 23
MEXICO 75 0 96 27 64 26 27 59 95 26 80 35
PERU 17 6 0 57 26 42 0 81 7 32 0
PHILIPPINES 34 26 23 34 98 0 90 36 26 15 19
POLAND 93 97 89 95 49 35 30 78 26 49 100 90 90 27
ROMANIA 0 30 58 90 91 21 29 14
SERBIA, REPUBLIC OF 23 26 87 34 99 26 95
SOUTH AFRICA 96 100 88 59 59 93 57 29 59 59 96 97 93
THAILAND 99 26 34 23 91 38 31 15 30 18 25 76 41
TURKEY 82 51 59 93 96 55 93
De facto regime probability, such that for a country and for a year, the probability of having a fixed + an intermediate + a floating
arrangement = 1. Period displayed: after IT adoption.
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Table C.12: Inflation Targeting Regime
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
ALBANIA Hybrid Hybrid Hybrid Hybrid
ARMENIA Flexible Flexible Flexible Flexible Flexible Hybrid Flexible
BRAZIL Flexible Hybrid Flexible Flexible Flexible Hybrid Flexible Hybrid Hybrid Flexible Flexible Hybrid Flexible Hybrid
CHILE Flexible Flexible Flexible Hybrid Hybrid Flexible Flexible Hybrid Hybrid Flexible Flexible Flexible Flexible Flexible
COLOMBIA Flexible Flexible Hybrid Flexible Flexible Flexible Hybrid Hybrid Flexible Flexible Flexible Flexible Hybrid Flexible
CZECH REPUBLIC Flexible Hybrid Hybrid Flexible Hybrid Hybrid Hybrid Flexible Flexible Flexible Flexible Flexible Flexible Flexible
GHANA Hybrid Flexible Hybrid Flexible Hybrid Flexible
GUATEMALA Hybrid Hybrid Hybrid Hybrid Hybrid Hybrid Hybrid Hybrid
HUNGARY Hybrid Flexible Hybrid Hybrid Hybrid Flexible Hybrid Flexible Hybrid Hybrid Hybrid Hybrid
INDONESIA Flexible Hybrid Flexible Flexible Flexible Hybrid Hybrid Hybrid
MEXICO Flexible Hybrid Flexible Hybrid Flexible Hybrid Hybrid Flexible Flexible Hybrid Flexible Hybrid
PERU Hybrid Hybrid Hybrid Flexible Hybrid Hybrid Hybrid Flexible Hybrid Hybrid Hybrid
PHILIPPINES Hybrid Hybrid Hybrid Hybrid Flexible Hybrid Flexible Hybrid Hybrid Hybrid Hybrid
POLAND Flexible Flexible Flexible Flexible Flexible Hybrid Hybrid Flexible Hybrid Flexible Flexible Flexible Flexible Hybrid
ROMANIA Hybrid Hybrid Flexible Flexible Flexible Hybrid Hybrid Hybrid
SERBIA, REPUBLIC OF Hybrid Hybrid Flexible Hybrid Flexible Hybrid Flexible
SOUTH AFRICA Flexible Flexible Flexible Flexible Flexible Flexible Flexible Hybrid Flexible Flexible Flexible Flexible Flexible
THAILAND Flexible Hybrid Hybrid Hybrid Flexible Hybrid Hybrid Hybrid Hybrid Hybrid Hybrid Flexible Hybrid
TURKEY Flexible Flexible Flexible Flexible Flexible Flexible Flexible
De facto regime based on highest probability for three possible arrangements: “Float” for perfectly floating exchange-rates, “Inter”
for intermediate or managed float exchange-rate arrangements and “Fix” for rigid systems.
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